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INTRODUCTION

Article I, section 11 of the Florida Constitution states: “No person shall
be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.”1 This provision has been
* Jeannette M. Watkin, Esq., J.D., Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center, 2012, B.A., Florida International University, 1999. Ms. Watkin practices at JWatkin
Law, P.A. where she concentrates her practice in family and marital law matters. The author
dedicates this paper to her wonderful children for believing in their mom, her remarkable
parents for their unconditional love, her exceptional boyfriend and kids for their encouragement, and the rest of her family for their patience and support. The author wishes to extend a
special thank you to Professors Brion Blackwelder and Ross Baer for their advice and guid-
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judicially interpreted to exempt child support and alimony.2 The public policy rationale behind this exception is that it is a duty owed to the child, the
spouse, and to society as a whole.3 Florida does not enforce equitable distribution awards through contempt because such awards are considered debt
among spouses and the Florida Constitution prohibits imprisonment for
debt.4 Other states—like Arkansas, Iowa, Texas, North Carolina, New York,
Oklahoma, and Ohio—have constitutional prohibitions against imprisonment
for debt, but differ from Florida’s judicial interpretation of debt and the use
of contempt for the willful violation of an equitable distribution award, within the context of child support and alimony.5 This paper proposes the idea
that equitable distribution awards in Florida should not fall within the constitutional definition of “debt” and should therefore not be exempted from being enforced through contempt proceedings.
In 1981, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) tried to obtain some guidance as to what “debt” means for purposes of family law.6
The court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of
great public importance: Whether a spouse can be held in contempt of court
for failing to pay a bank loan that was unrelated to alimony.7 The high court
did not issue an opinion.8 Without any guidance as to this matter, Florida’s
district courts have interpreted the constitutional provisions to include equitable distribution in the definition of “debt.”9
ance in writing this paper. Lastly, the author wishes to thank the Nova Law Review for their
hard work.
1. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
2. Gibson v. Bennett, 561 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1990) (citing State ex rel. Krueger v.
Stone, 188 So. 575, 576 (Fla. 1939)).
3. Fishman v. Fishman, 656 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1995) (citing Gibson, 561 So. 2d at
570).
4. Kea v. Kea, 839 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Schminkey v.
Schminkey, 400 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)); see also FLA. CONST. art. I, §
11; Burke v. Burke, 336 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Jeff Lefkowitz,
Note, Property Division Obligations and the Constitutional Prohibition of Imprisonment for
Debt, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1310 (1980).
5. Compare Kea, 839 So. 2d at 904 (citing Schminkey, 400 So. 2d at 122), with ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 16, and IOWA CONST. art. I, § 19, and OHIO CONST. art. I, § 15, and OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 13, and Intrator v. Intrator, 929 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Div. 2011), and
Cobb v. Cobb, 282 S.E.2d 591, 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (citing N.C. CONST. art. I, § 28), and
Ex parte Anderson, 541 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, §
18; Ex parte Sutherland, 526 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. 1975)).
6. See Schminkey, 400 So. 2d at 121–22; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
7. Schminkey, 400 So. 2d at 122.
8. See id.
9. See Kea, 839 So. 2d at 904 (citing Hobbs v. Hobbs, 518 So. 2d 439, 440–41 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Marks v. Marks, 457 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
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Florida’s rationale for disallowing contempt for equitable distribution is
based on the concept that transfer of money among spouses in the form of
cash,10 securities and bonds,11 repayment of a mortgage,12 or repayment of a
debt to a third party13 pursuant to a final judgment, is considered debt among
spouses.14 The end result is an unfair situation where spouses—who have
jointly acquired assets throughout the duration of their marriage—are afforded only creditor-debtor remedies to enforce otherwise equitable distribution awards.15
II.

THE TERM “SUPPORT” PURSUANT TO THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION

For more than a century, the Supreme Court of Florida has recognized
child support and alimony as exceptions to the no imprisonment for debt
clause.16 As early as 1901, the court in Bronk v. State,17 recognized the right
of alimony and child support as the responsibility of the spouse with the
higher ability to maintain the other spouse “arising out of the duties incident
to the marital status.”18 These exceptions are enforced through contempt
because the court is not enforcing a debt, rather a duty owed to the former
spouse,19 the children, and a “personal duty” from the payor spouse to society
as a whole.20

Ball v. Ball, 440 So. 2d 677, 679 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983)); La Roche v. La Roche, 662
So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Hertrich v. Hertrich, 643 So. 2d 115,
116 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam); Veiga v. State, 561 So. 2d 1335, 1336 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
10. See Braswell v. Braswell, 881 So. 2d 1193, 1198–99 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
11. See Lakin v. Lakin, 901 So. 2d 186, 189–90 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6) (2012)).
12. Kea, 839 So. 2d at 904.
13. Schminkey, 400 So. 2d at 122.
14. Kea, 839 So. 2d at 904; Schminkey, 400 So. 2d at 121.
15. Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing DeSantis v. DeSantis, 714 So. 2d 637, 638 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
16. See, e.g., Bronk v. State, 31 So. 248, 252 (Fla. 1901) (analyzing FLA. CONST. art. I, §
11).
17. 31 So. 248 (Fla. 1901).
18. See id. at 251–52.
19. Riley v. Riley, 509 So. 2d 1366, 1368–69 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (citing State
ex rel. Krueger v. Stone, 188 So. 575, 576 (Fla. 1939); Bronk, 31 So. at 252; Howard v. Howard, 118 So. 2d 90, 94 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960)).
20. Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Alfred A. Colby, Some Proposed Changes to the Florida
Constitution, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1519, 1521–22 (1994).
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Equitable distribution in Florida is enforced through contempt when the
basis is in the nature of support,21 or in cases that include transfer of real
property.22 Over the years, Florida has broadened its contempt powers but
not far enough to include equitable distribution awards.23 In Pabian v. Pabian,24 the Fourth DCA found that car payments pursuant to the final judgment were in the form of support.25 The husband was held in contempt for
failure to make the car payments and the court explained that a car is in the
nature of support, just like food and shelter, because of the important “role
which an automobile plays in our daily lives.”26 In Cummings v. Cummings,27 the Fourth DCA found the first two lump sum equitable distribution
payments were contemplated as support payments for the wife and the children.28 The husband had the ability, but willfully failed to pay, and therefore,
contempt was appropriate.29
III. CONTEMPT OF TRANSFER OF MONEY PAYMENTS VS. PROPERTY
INTEREST
In Florida, when enforcing equitable distribution awards, relief is usually limited to the ordinary claims between debtor and creditor.30 However,
many courts will use contempt when the interest being conveyed is a property interest, and not a monetary payment.31 Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.570(c)(2) allows a court to enforce its orders, requiring performance of an
act through contempt.32 Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.570 incorporates Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.570, which means that a family

21. E.g., Cummings v. Cummings, 37 So. 3d 287, 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(citing Pabian v. Pabian, 480 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)); Zuccarello v.
Zuccarello, 429 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
22. See, e.g., Pennington v. Pennington, 390 So. 2d 809, 809–10 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
23. See Marks & Colby, supra note 20, at 1525–26.
24. 480 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
25. Id. at 238.
26. Id.
27. 37 So. 3d 287 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
28. Id. at 290–91.
29. Id. at 291.
30. Carlin v. Carlin, 310 So. 2d 403, 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (per curiam)
(citing Howell v. Howell, 207 So. 2d 507, 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968)).
31. 3 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 9:17, at 64–65 (3d ed.
2005).
32. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.570(c)(2).
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judge “may hold a spouse in contempt for fail[ure] to [abide by] a specific
act” as stated in a final judgment.33
For example, in Riley v. Riley,34 the trial court held the husband in contempt for failing to abide by the settlement agreement that required the husband to name the “former wife, as [the] beneficiary of a life insurance policy.”35 The Fifth DCA affirmed that contempt was appropriate because the
husband was required to do a specific act as required by the final dissolution
of marriage, rather than pay money.36 Likewise, in Burke v. Burke,37 the final
judgment of dissolution ordered the husband to execute and deliver various
documents necessary to release the wife’s interest in a note and mortgage
and to transfer securities to the wife.38 The husband was held in contempt for
failing to execute and deliver the documents.39 The Fourth DCA affirmed,
stating that “the trial court’s order of compliance, was in effect a mandatory
order for the specific performance of that act.”40 The husband was not required to pay money, but rather perform an act, and his refusal to abide by
the court order “was willful and deliberate and not caused by his inability to
comply.”41 Similarly, in Firestone v. Ferguson,42 the final judgment ordered
the sale of the parties’ farm at a specific price.43 The wife refused to execute
the sale documents and was held in contempt.44 The Third DCA affirmed,
explaining that the wife was required to perform the act of executing the sale
documents.45
In contrast, when a final divorce judgment requires one spouse to pay
monies not in the nature of support, then the constitutional provisions of article I, section 11 are implicated.46 In McQuady v. McQuady,47 the parties
borrowed $15,000 for a business loan using as collateral the wife’s separate

33. Roth v. Roth, 973 So. 2d 580, 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), review dismissed, 36
So. 3d 84 (Fla. 2010); see also FLA R. CIV. P. 1.570; FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.570.
34. 509 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
35. Id. at 1367.
36. Id. at 1370.
37. 336 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
38. Id. at 1238.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 372 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
43. Id. at 491.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 492.
46. McQuady v. McQuady, 523 So. 2d 785, 786 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (citing
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11).
47. 523 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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property.48 In a separate agreement, the husband agreed to indemnify the
wife and pay back the loan without any duty on her part.49 The final divorce
judgment ordered the wife to pay the loan and ordered “the husband to pay
the wife $15,000 ‘as lump sum alimony’ at $250 per month” over five
years.50 The husband appealed and argued that he should not be forced to
pay alimony “as a tool to accomplish an equitable distribution,” and the appellate court held that the husband could not be held in contempt for failing
to pay the wife $15,000 because it violated Florida’s imprisonment for debt
clause, despite their prior agreement.51
IV. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION DECREES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
“DEBTS” WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF FLORIDA’S
CONSTITUTION FOR PUBLIC POLICY REASONS
Successful marriages usually require spouses to forego certain career
opportunities for the benefit of one another.52 The law recognizes those sacrifices, and therefore, acknowledges that one spouse may be more financially independent and successful than the other.53 Courts usually compensate
for this disparity by granting unequal property awards and any other relief
they find equitable in light of the circumstances.54 “Specific obligations of
one party to deliver property to an ex-spouse should be viewed in light of
this underlying purpose.”55 The law should not view final divorce decrees as
a common commercial affair, but rather take into account the nature of the
marriage relationship.56 It seems only logical that the assets accumulated
through joint efforts and joint economies of the parties during their marriage
be enforced in the same manner as child support and alimony.57 Public policy supports the idea that final judgment decrees be enforced through contempt since it involves rights and obligations from one spouse to the other.58
The reality is that without contempt of court to compel compliance with
equitable distribution awards, the courts are powerless to compel transfers of

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss1/5

Id. at 786.
Id.
Id.
Id. 786–87 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11).
Lefkowitz, supra note 4, at 1315.
Id.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 61.075(1)(a)–(j) (2012).
Lefkowitz, supra note 4, at 1315.
Id. at 1314.
See id. at 1313.
See id. (citing Ex parte Davis, 111 S.W. 394, 396 (Tex. 1908)).
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cash, stocks, bonds, or property, which are unrelated to support.59 Jailing a
party who refuses to comply with a court order by contempt is “the most
effective [remedy] of enforcing divorce judgments.”60 Contempt and jail
time are unpleasant affairs, and therefore, people will usually comply with a
court order to avoid incarceration.61 The following are public policy reasons
why the judiciary, through case law, should except equitable distribution
from Florida’s no imprisonment for debt clause.
A. Delivery of an Asset Pursuant to a Final Divorce Judgment Should Not
Be Considered Payment of a Debt
Florida Statute section 61.075 defines marital assets as
(a) Assets acquired . . . during the marriage, individually by either
spouse or jointly by them; (b) [t]he enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital assets resulting either from the efforts of
either party during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or other forms of marital assets,
or both; (c) [i]nterspousal gifts during the marriage; (d) [a]ll vested
and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during the marriage in retirement, pension . . . and insurance plans and pro62
grams.

Marital assets, as defined by statute, previously belonged to both husband and wife, however titled.63 Derivation of the marital property may have
been from enhancement, active appreciation, non-interspousal gifts or joint
efforts during the marriage.64 Upon entry of a final judgment, Florida case
law states that if the equitable distribution is not in the form of support, it is a
debt, and the violating spouse cannot be incarcerated via the contempt power
for non-payment.65 The enforcement problem begins when the equitable
distribution is characterized as a debt.66 The court has previously established
that debt is a marital asset for purposes of equitable distribution.67 This cha59. See, e.g., Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(citing La Roche v. La Roche, 662 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
60. Lefkowitz, supra note 4, at 1307.
61. See id.
62. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6)(a)1.a.–d. (2012).
63. Id. § 61.075(6)(a)1.a.
64. Id. § 61.075(6)(a)1.b.
65. See Cummings v. Cummings, 37 So. 3d 287, 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010);
Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
66. See Kea v. Kea, 839 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
67. See Kadanec, 765 So. 2d at 886.
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racterization is contrary to the modern conception of what a debt is.68 First,
parties to a dissolution of marriage are joint owners of certain assets classified as marital property in the equitable distribution.69 Upon dissolution, a
duty to separate assets is obligatory among the spouses and should not imply
the creation of a debt because the assets previously belonged to both.70 To
comply with constitutional provisions, the court should inquire whether an
ability to pay the equitable distribution exists.71 If the court finds that a
spouse willfully refuses to comply, then contempt is appropriate since the
payor spouse holds “the key to his [own jail] cell.”72
Second, a marital duty to deliver or pay is not the same as a debtor’s obligation to a creditor.73 The Supreme Court of Florida stated in State ex rel.
Lanz v. Dowling74 that debt is within the meaning of the Florida Constitution,75 and debt “must be those arising exclusively from actions ex contractu.”76 Black’s Law Dictionary defines ex contractu as “[a]rising from a contract.”77 The general idea of dividing property belonging to spouses is very
different than “the arm’s length transaction between the [commercial] debtor
and creditor.”78 “Marriage . . . is not a matter of commerce, nor . . . a contract” in which debts are incurred.79 Rather, it “is a basic social institution of
the highest type and importance, in which society at large has a vital interest.”80 The constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt was meant
to apply to debts arising under the law, not from marital status.81 The obliga68. Compare id., with State ex rel. Lanz v. Dowling, 110 So. 522, 525 (Fla. 1926), and
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 648 (9th ed. 2009).
69. See FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6)(a)2.
70. See, e.g., Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1979).
71. See id.
72. Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1977) (citing Demetree v. State ex rel.
Marsh, 89 So. 2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1956); Faircloth v. Faircloth, 321 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1975); In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d 374, 379 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965)); see also
Pabian v. Pabian, 480 So. 2d 237, 238–39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
73. See Dowling, 110 So. at 525 (citing Carr v. State, 17 So. 350, 352 (Ala. 1895)); Kea
v. Kea, 839 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
74. 110 So. 522 (Fla. 1926).
75. Id. at 525 (noting that “the [F]ederal Constitution [has] no such provision” regarding
imprisonment for debt and suggesting that one must look to state definitions to interpret the
definition); see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
76. Dowling, 110 So. at 525 (citing Carr, 17 So. at 352).
77. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 648 (9th ed. 2009).
78. Lefkowitz, supra note 4, at 1315.
79. Holloway v. Holloway, 198 N.E. 579, 580 (Ohio 1935).
80. Id.
81. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Lenger, 336 N.W.2d 191, 193 (Iowa 1983) (quoting
Roberts v. Fuller, 229 N.W. 163, 167 (Iowa 1930)); Viajes Lesana, Inc. v. Saavedra, 15 P.R.
Offic. Trans. 927, 929 (P.R. 1984).
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tion to comply with equitable distribution awards is a duty that “arises out of
the marital relationship and not [from] a business [negotiation].”82 Therefore, when the Florida Constitution speaks about debt, the term should be
construed and defined as a contract arising out of business relationships, and
is not applicable in the marriage context.83
B. Incarceration Is a Means to Punish the Willful Violation of a Court
Order, Not for the Debt
The Florida Constitution currently prohibits the incarceration of a person due to debt,84 and the courts have construed the refusal to abide by the
equitable distribution within a final judgment decree as debt.85 This is because under the judicial construction of the Florida Constitution, the surrendering of marital assets not related to support is ordinary debt.86 Therefore,
courts protect a willful violator in the same sense that they protect an indigent person from contempt regarding child support, or commercial debtors
from creditors.87
How is a court to enforce an equitable distribution award against a willful violator without contempt of court? Historically, courts need the power
to enforce their own rulings; otherwise:
[W]ithout the power our judicial system would become a mere
mockery for a party to a cause could make of himself a judge of
the validity of orders which had been issued and by his own acts of
disobedience set them aside, thereby ultimately producing the
88
complete impotency of the judicial process.

As stated by the Riley court, “[t]oo restrictive a view of a court’s contempt
powers would render it impotent like a toothless lion, who can only roar in
dismay at the disobedience of his decrees.”89

82. California Divorce Agreements—Alimony or Property Settlement?, 2 STAN. L. REV.
731, 739–40 (1950).
83. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11; California Divorce Agreement—Alimony or Property
Settlement?, supra note 82, at 739–40.
84. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
85. See, e.g., Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886–87 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(citing DeSantis v. DeSantis, 714 So. 2d 637, 638 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
86. See, e.g., id.
87. See Demetree v. State ex rel. Marsh, 89 So. 2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1956); Kadanec, 765
So. 2d at 886.
88. Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 501.
89. Riley v. Riley, 509 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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When a former spouse is imprisoned, it is for the willful violation of a
court order, not for the inability to pay the debt.90 The imprisonment is a
consequence of the blatant disregard for a court order and does not violate
constitutional provisions since he “‘carries the key of his prison in his own
pocket.’”91 This means that upon the compliance of the court order, the
jailed party is immediately released.92
In Florida, the courts do inquire as to whether the alleged contemnor
has the ability to pay.93 Recognition that the Florida Constitution allows
contempt to enforce equitable distribution awards promotes respect for the
courts and the judicial system.94 Contempt powers are useful because they
“enable[] courts to persuade parties to obey a prior order or decree of the
court so that such prior order will not be rendered ineffectual by recalcitrant
litigants.”95 The Florida Constitution allows supreme court judges, appellate
judges, and circuit court judges the jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus.96 It states that the courts “[m]ay issue . . . all writs necessary [or proper]
to the complete exercise of [their] jurisdiction.”97 Therefore, it defies logic
that the courts would be rendered powerless to execute their own orders in
the family context, and allow willful violators to disregard the court order
without any consequence.
C.

Unjust Enrichment

“The doctrine [of unjust enrichment] is a recognition that a person is accountable to another on the ground that if the former were not required to do
so, he would unjustly benefit, or the other would unjustly suffer loss.”98 The
willful violator is unjustly enriched when he fails to comply with the equitable distribution award while the payee spouse has to spend money to enforce
the award by hiring lawyers to pursue a civil remedy. Contempt of court is
90. Id. at 1368 (citing State ex rel. Krueger v. Stone, 188 So. 575, 576 (Fla. 1939); Bronk
v. State, 31 So. 248, 251 (Fla. 1901); Howard v. Howard, 118 So. 2d 90, 94 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1960)).
91. Id.; Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 501 (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir.
1902)).
92. Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 501.
93. Elliott v. Bradshaw, 59 So. 3d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam)
(citing Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1985)).
94. See Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1979) (citing Ex parte Browne, 543
S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tex. 1976)).
95. Id. at 844 (citing Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. 1976)).
96. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 3(b)(9), 4(b)(3), 5(b).
97. Id. § 3(b)(7); see also id. §§ 4(b)(3), 5(b).
98. Golden v. Woodward, 15 So. 3d 664, 669 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (alterations in
original) (citing Circle Fin. Co. v. Peacock, 399 So. 2d 81, 84 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
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an easy remedy, for both the courts and for the spouse seeking to enforce the
award. The public policy for allowing contempt is twofold: First, it would
avoid unnecessary litigation in civil court to enforce a domestic matter, and
second, it would allow an effective and quick remedy to enforce the courts’
orders.
Civil law has carved out statutes of limitations, causes of action, and
remedies for unjust enrichment.99 The purpose of unjust enrichment is “‘to
prevent the wrongful [custody] of a benefit, . . . money, or property [that
belongs to someone else] in violation of good conscience and fundamental
principles of justice or equity.’”100 The family court stands as the lone exception to the enforcement of unjust enrichment by failing to enforce equitable distribution awards.
It is a waste of resources for a spouse to file a civil suit to enforce a marital obligation and only be afforded a creditor-debtor remedy.101 Further, the
payee spouse may not have the financial means to pursue a civil remedy, and
therefore the equitable distribution award will be uncollectable, thereby
enriching the payor spouse.102 In Murphy v. Murphy,103 the Third DCA held
that the husband could not be held in contempt for failing to pay over
$108,000 in special equity to the wife without explicit findings that he “‘had
the [financial] ability to comply with the order and [had] willfully refused to
do so.’”104 In Kadanec v. Kadanec,105 the husband failed to pay the wife
“$20,945 as equitable distribution of the [h]usband’s profit sharing plan,”
and was held in contempt by the trial court.106 The Second DCA “reversed
because property division awards may not be enforced by contempt.”107 In
the case at bar, the wife was denied alimony and only received half of the
husband’s pension valued at $20,945.108 The court ordered a money payment
of $20,945, which the wife was unable to enforce through contempt.109 The
99. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.110(a)–(b); 1 NORM LACOE, LA COE’S PLEADINGS UNDER THE
FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WITH FORMS R. 1.110(427), at 590–91 (2011 ed.).
100. Golden, 15 So. 3d at 670 (quoting Henry M. Butler, Inc. v. Trizec Props., Inc., 524
So. 2d 710, 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
101. See Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Murphy
v. Murphy, 370 So. 2d 403, 409 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
102. See Murphy, 370 So. 2d at 409.
103. 370 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
104. Id. at 409 (quoting Adams v. Adams, 357 So. 2d 264, 265 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1978)).
105. 765 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
106. Id. at 886.
107. Id. (citing La Roche v. La Roche, 662 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1995)).
108. Id. at 885.
109. Id. at 886.
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consequence of lack of contempt was to deprive the wife of the asset, as if
she had not received anything at all, and to unjustly enrich the husband by
keeping the full pension valued at $41,890.110 Contempt is an efficient and
effective tool for enforcing family court laws.111 When contempt is unavailable, the remedies become very expensive for the payee spouse (i.e. hiring an
attorney to enforce through specific performance or creditor-debtor remedy,
or even worse, not enforcing at all).112
D.

Undermining Settlement Agreements

Under certain circumstances, parties in mediation or in private agreements waive certain benefits to obtain others.113 For example, a spouse may
waive years of alimony for a quicker and more immediate equitable distribution payment.114 However, if enforcements of property settlement agreements are not upheld by Florida courts, the quicker and more immediate
payment of money, as originally bargained for, is a fictitious proposition.
The spouse that trades his right to alimony forever waives the claim, and is
left with neither alimony nor equitable distribution monies.
In Randall v. Randall,115 the former wife, in an open court agreement,
waived alimony in exchange for a one-half ownership and one-half equity
value in the parties’ business valued at $500,000, which was titled in the
husband’s name.116 The husband was responsible for getting the business “in
order,” otherwise, the wife would take over the operations.117 The husband
was given permission to pay certain debts of the parties from the cash flow
of the business.118 Five months after the final judgment was ordered, the
court entered an order finding that the husband had “violated virtually every
provision of the final” divorce decree, and left the business worthless.119 The
court ordered the husband to report whether he had paid the wife $250,000 or
110. See Kadanec, 765 So. 2d at 886.
111. See Family Law Blog: Power of Contempt in Post Judgment Enforcement Cases, L.
OFFS. JAMES S. CUNHA, P.A. (June 26, 2012), http://jcunhalaw.com/lawyer/2012/06/26
/Post_Judgment_Enforcement/Power_of_Contempt_in_Post_Judgment_Enforcement_Cases_
bl4488.htm.
112. E.g., Kadanec, 765 So. 2d at 886 (citing DeSantis v. DeSantis, 714 So. 2d 637, 638
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
113. See Randall v. Randall, 948 So. 2d 71, 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
114. See id.
115. 948 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
116. Id. at 71.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 71–72.
119. Id. at 72.
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sold the warehouse.120 If he did not, he would be held in contempt and could
only purge himself of contempt by complying with the order.121 In Randall,
we see a spouse who took advantage of the fact that his wife waived alimony
for a larger equitable distribution award.122 The husband sought to avoid
paying his wife by making the asset worthless.123 In this case, the appellate
court provided equity to the wife.124 Had the court not used its contempt
power, the husband would have been able to take advantage of his wife and
the court by simply not complying with the agreement without any repercussion.
V.

ALLOWING CONTEMPT FOR FINAL DIVORCE DECREES—THE
EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS

In Florida, there are minimal remedies available to enforce equitable
distribution,125 and therefore the wise thing to do is to include the source of
payment in the final judgment. Another possible solution is to enter an injunction preventing dissipation of those assets when one spouse owes money
to the other or when a judge makes findings as to the existence of property or
assets.126 These remedies would enforce the payment to the payee spouse,
and save the judicial system time from hearing these matters. In addition, the
Florida Statutes should enforce equitable distribution with the same remedies available for child support and alimony: “Attachment or garnishment,”127 “suspension or denial of professional licenses and certificates,”128
and “[s]uspension of driver’s licenses and motor vehicle registrations.”129
Enforcement of equitable distribution awards is unnecessarily problematic
without action by the courts or the legislature.

120. Randall, 948 So. 2d at 72–73.
121. Id. at 73.
122. See id. at 71–72.
123. Id. at 72.
124. See id. at 74–75.
125. 2 JUDGE RENEE GOLDENBERG, FLORIDA FAMILY LAW & PRACTICE § 21:05, at 21-8
(rev. 6 2011).
126. See Benjamin M. Ellis, Note, Protecting the Right to Marital Property: Ensuring a
Full Equitable Distribution Award with Fraudulent Conveyance Law, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
1709, 1740 (2009).
127. FLA. STAT. § 61.12 (2012).
128. Id. § 61.13015.
129. Id. § 61.13016.
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VI. CONTEMPT ARISING OUT OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN
OTHER STATES DO NOT VIOLATE THE STATE CONSTITUTION’S “NO
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT” CLAUSE
Various states endorse the view that contempt proceedings should be
enforced when one party willfully fails to comply with an equitable distribution award.130 In Brown v. Brown,131 an Arkansas case, the parties had “incorporat[ed] a property settlement agreement” into the divorce decree, which
required the husband to pay the wife $50,000.132 “[P]rior to [the] divorce,
[the husband] filed for voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy” and claimed that he
was financially unable to pay his wife, but he never rendered a Chapter 11
plan, nor informed the court about a farming partnership he held with his
mother.133 The trial court found that the husband “willfully fail[ed] to comply with” the order and held him in contempt of court.134 The husband appealed, arguing that his imprisonment violated article II, section 16 of the
Arkansas Constitution for imprisonment of debt.135 The Supreme Court of
Arkansas stated that “neither the bankruptcy [court] nor, . . . the chancellor,
believed” that the husband was unable to pay the wife.136 The husband
created his own inability to pay; therefore contempt was proper and did not
violate the Arkansas Constitution.137
The Supreme Court of Iowa similarly found in In re Marriage of Lenger,138 that the husband was in contempt of court when he willfully failed to
pay any part of the property settlement agreement to the wife, which consisted of a car and $55,000 payable in installments.139 The court held that
contempt was appropriate and would not violate article I, section 19 of the
Iowa Constitution for imprisonment of debt because it is necessary to enforce
provisions of a divorce decree, despite it being independent from child support and alimony matters.140 The court reasoned that a debt, as referenced in
130. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 809 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Ark. 1991); Intrator v. Intrator, 929
N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Div. 2011).
131. 809 S.W.2d 808 (Ark. 1991).
132. Id. at 808.
133. Id. at 808–09.
134. Id. at 808.
135. Id.
136. Brown, 809 S.W.2d at 809.
137. Id. (citing Ex parte Coffelt, 389 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Ark. 1965)).
138. 336 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa 1983).
139. Id. at 191.
140. Id. at 192–93 (citing Callenius v. Blair, 309 N.W.2d 415, 418–19 (Iowa 1981); Roach
v. Oliver, 244 N.W. 899, 902 (Iowa 1932) (per curiam); Roberts v. Fuller, 229 N.W. 163,
167–68 (Iowa 1930)); see IOWA CONST. art. I, § 19.
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the Iowa Constitution, is defined as “an obligation growing out of a business
transaction, and not to an obligation arising from the existence of the marital
status.”141 Last, the court stated that the imprisonment was not only a punishment for the owing of monies, but also for the willful violation of a court
order.142 Contempt of court was proper and not rendered a debt within the
meaning of the Iowa Constitution.143
In Conrad v. Conrad,144 the husband failed to transfer over stock certificates and monies to the wife pursuant to a final judgment.145 The Court of
Appeals of North Carolina allowed the husband to be released from jail upon
the transfer of the property to the wife.146 The court further obliged the husband to pay for the wife’s attorney’s fees, as well as compensate her for the
stock split and the dividends that occurred due to his failure to comply with
the final judgment while he was incarcerated.147
New York also endorses the view that contempt orders are enforceable
when parties violate equitable distribution orders.148 In Intrator v. Intrator,149
the court made an equitable distribution that mandated the husband to pay
the wife, among other things, half of the proceeds of their boat if sold and
half of the equity if not sold.150 The husband refused to do so for a period of
over two years, and the wife filed for contempt of court for arrears as well as
the boat payment.151 Subsequently, the parties entered into a stipulation
where the husband was going to use his best efforts to pay the wife a settlement amount of $131,000, as well as sell the boat.152 In the stipulation, even
though the wife waived her ability to hold the husband in contempt of court
for failing to pay the judgment amount, the husband’s refusal to sell the boat
was not waived by the stipulation.153 He was therefore held in contempt of
court for failing to pay the wife her portion of the equal distribution.154
Similarly, Oklahoma has a no imprisonment for debt clause in its constitution under article II, section 13.155 In McCrary v. McCrary,156 the Su141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
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In re Marriage of Lenger, 336 N.W.2d at 193 (quoting Roberts, 229 N.W. at 167).
Id. (quoting Roberts, 229 N.W. at 167); see Roach, 244 N.W. at 902.
In re Marriage of Lenger, 336 N.W.2d at 193 (quoting Roberts, 229 N.W. at 167).
348 S.E.2d 349 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
See id. at 350.
See id. at 349–50 (citing Blair v. Blair, 173 S.E.2d 513, 514 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970)).
Id. at 350.
See Intrator v. Intrator, 929 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Div. 2011).
929 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 2011).
Id. at 588.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Intrator, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 13.
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preme Court of Oklahoma found no constitutional violation when the former
wife filed contempt for the former husband’s failure to comply with a final
divorce judgment to pay the couple’s back income tax liability.157 The court
stated that the Oklahoma Constitution expressly provides for contempt as a
means of punishment, and its purpose is twofold: First, as punishment for
willful violation of a court order, and second, by obtaining compliance of a
court order.158 Furthermore, the court explained that when a spouse has the
means to comply with the final divorce decree, “and fails to do so, [the court
finds] a willful disobedience” that takes it out of the constitutional provision
against imprisonment for debt.159
Another state supporting this proposition is Ohio.160 In Harris v. Har161
ris, the Supreme Court of Ohio ratified that contempt proceedings do not
violate the no imprisonment for debt clause162 for willful violations of a final
divorce judgment.163 The husband failed in his obligation164 to transfer a
Buick automobile to the wife and pay the debts owed on the car, plus
$60,000.165 The wife filed for contempt and the husband argued violation of
state constitutional provisions.166 The court affirmed the contempt order and
reasoned that to enforce contempt based on the label of the terms in a divorce
agreement, whether it is property settlement, alimony, or child support, is
arbitrary and artificial.167 Property settlement agreements, child support, and
alimony all fall under the marital exceptions in the Ohio Constitution.168
Furthermore, the use of contempt to enforce final divorce judgments supports
the public policy of allowing the distribution of assets that have been accumulated throughout the marriage by the parties.169
In Ex parte Gorena,170 the Supreme Court of Texas analyzed whether its
no imprisonment for debt clause in article I, section 18 of the Texas Consti156. 723 P.2d 268 (Okla. 1986).
157. Id. at 270–71.
158. Id. at 271 (citing Burnett v. State, 129 P. 1110, 1117–18 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913)).
159. Id.
160. Pugh v. Pugh, 472 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (Ohio 1984) (citing Harris v. Harris, 390
N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ohio 1979)).
161. 390 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1979).
162. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 15.
163. Harris, 390 N.E.2d at 794.
164. Id. at 791.
165. Id. at 794 n.1 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 791 (majority opinion).
167. Id. at 792–94 (quoting Hogan v. Hogan, 278 N.E.2d 367, 368–69 (Ohio Ct. App.
1972)).
168. Harris, 390 N.E. 2d at 792, 794; see OHIO CONST. art. I, § 15.
169. Harris, 390 N.E. 2d at 793.
170. 595 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1979).
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tution171 was violated in the family context.172 The former husband was incarcerated after refusing to pay the former wife almost half of his military
retirement benefits every month, pursuant to a final judgment decree.173 The
judge questioned whether incarcerating him for non-payment was imprisonment for debt.174 The Supreme Court of Texas reasoned that incarcerating
him was not unconstitutional since the court was merely requiring him to
surrender property that was previously joined by the spouses pursuant to the
final divorce judgment.175 Similarly, in Ex parte Anderson,176 a Texas trial
court ordered Mr. Anderson to pay his former wife a portion of his military
proceeds as long as he received it.177 When he failed to do so and was incarcerated, he alleged imprisonment for debt pursuant to the Texas Constitution,
article I, section 18.178 The court first reasoned that “he is not paying a debt
to [his wife] but is surrendering the share to which [she] is legally entitled.”179 Additionally, the court reasoned that his status as trustee does not
change into that of a debtor when he pays directly to the wife instead of depositing directly into the court registry to then forward it to his wife.180 Lastly, the court held that a huge burden would be placed on the district clerk if
they were obliged to receive and disburse all payments, such as this.181
VII. CARVING OUT THE RELIEF THROUGH CASE LAW
Child support and alimony are exceptions, which have been carved out
from the no imprisonment clause of the Florida Constitution.182 However,
these basic exceptions have not yet been expressly accounted for in the Constitution.183 They have become common knowledge and have been recog-

171. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
172. Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d at 846; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
173. Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d at 843.
174. Id. at 846; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
175. Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d at 846 (citing Ex parte Sutherland, 526 S.W.2d 536,
539 (Tex. 1975)).
176. 541 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
177. Id. at 287.
178. Id.; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
179. Ex parte Anderson, 541 S.W. 2d at 287.
180. Id. at 288.
181. Id.
182. See Gibson v. Bennett, 561 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1990) (citing State ex rel. Krueger
v. Stone, 188 So. 575, 576 (Fla. 1939)); Bronk v. State, 31 So. 248, 252 (Fla. 1901); see also
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
183. Marks & Colby, supra note 20, at 1521 n.7.
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nized through case law.184 Similarly, if courts recognize equitable distribution awards pertaining to support obligations as another exception to article I,
section 11, the exception will be carved out through judicial interpretation
until the Constitution is revised.185
VIII. CONCLUSION
Florida should use contempt as a means of enforcing equitable distribution awards in the same way it allows for enforcement of child support and
alimony.186 It constitutes public policy to enforce the division of assets that
were accumulated through joint efforts during an intact marriage.187 Florida
should join the numerous other states that enforce final divorce decrees
through contempt.188 In so doing, the Florida family courts will send a message that the surrendering of marital assets is obligatory upon a spouse and
the violation of the courts’ rulings will be enforced through contempt.189

184. See Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 570 (citing Stone, 188 So. at 576); Bronk, 31 So. at 252;
Marks & Colby, supra note 20, at 1521 n.7.
185. See Marks & Colby, supra note 20, at 1526–27; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
186. See Marks & Colby, supra note 20, at 1521.
187. Harris v. Harris, 390 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ohio 1979).
188. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 809 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Ark. 1991) (citing Ex parte Coffelt,
389 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Ark. 1965)); In re Marriage of Lenger, 336 N.W.2d 191, 192 (Iowa
1983); Conrad v. Conrad, 348 S.E.2d 349, 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
189. See Brown, 809 S.W.2d at 809; In re Marriage of Lenger, 336 N.W.2d at 192–93;
Conrad, 348 S.E.2d at 350. But see Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (citing La Roche v. La Roche, 662 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1995)).
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